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Introduction
Since Pareto’s seminal work (PARETO, 
1901), the sociology of social class and the 
sociology of elites have traditionally stood 
in opposition to each other. The founding 
fathers of the Italian school of elite soci-
ology were all critical of Marxist thought, 
and its focus on class conflicts as the main 
cause of social change (HARTMANN, 2007). 
That they also were skeptical towards mod-
ern democracy, and that a leading theorist 
like Robert Michels towards the end of his 
life was affiliated with the Italian fascist 
movement, added to the division. Despite 
calls for bridging the gap between the so-
ciology of social class and the sociology 
of elites (ARON, 1950 a, b; SCOTT, 1996), 
mutual skepticism and also negligence has 
therefore been more dominating than at-
tempts at combining elements from the two 
approaches. Insights and approaches that 
could have cross-fertilized the two tradi-
tions have therefore had difficulties when 
travelling from the one to the other.
Despite clear theoretical and political dif-
ferences, this is in many ways paradoxical. 
Even though Pareto was one of the first to 
focus on social mobility as the inter- and 
intra-generational circulation of elite group-
ings, most studies of social mobility have al-
most exclusively focused on class mobility 
(ERIKSON & GOLDTHORPE, 1992). Vice ver-
sa, important methodological innovations in 
mobility studies, as for instance log-linear 
modeling of mobility tables, have not found 
its way into studies of circulation mobility 
in the elites. In one sense, the situation can 
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therefore be described as one characterized 
by “splendid isolation” and of mutual mis-
recognition. In this article, we shall attempt 
to bridge parts of this gap by applying ap-
proaches and statistical techniques com-
monly used in studies of class mobility in 
an analysis of circulation mobility in elite 
formations. In this way, we’ll argue, new in-
sights into the stability and change of inter-
generational elite reproduction and circula-
tion can be gained.   
 Focusing on patterns of intergenera-
tional reproduction, we shall present an 
analysis of the internal and intergenera-
tional circulation at the top of the Nor-
wegian educational and professional hier-
archies. The analyses are done on register 
data on the whole Norwegian population 
born 1955-1975.  Data stem from multiple 
merged data registers. All individuals with 
a Norwegian social security number are in-
cluded in the data set. The quality of the 
data set is generally (and internationally) 
regarded as exceptionally high.
In the analysis of intergenerational edu-
cational mobility, we restrict ourselves to an 
analysis of all Norwegians born 1955-1975 
whose fathers have completed the longest 
higher educations, and who themselves 
have not experienced downward educa-
tional mobility. The offspring’s education 
was registered in 2008, when the youngest 
children were 33 years old. At this age, the 
overall majority had finished their educa-
tions. With these restrictions applied, we 
focus in on 1.3% of the cohort population. 
While these children have succeeded in re-
producing their fathers’ educational levels, 
they might even so have educations from 
other disciplines. 
Thereafter, following a similar strategy, 
we shall analyze the professional mobil-
ity barriers and trajectories of the children 
whose fathers were CEOs or worked in a 
free or a “learned  profession”  in 1980, and 
who themselves have ended up in similar 
positions approximately 25 years later (in 
the years 2003-2008). This group of inheri-
tors constitute 0.6% of the total Norwegian 
cohort population. In combination, a sub-
stantial proportion of the Norwegian elites 
is recruited from these two subgroups of 
inheritors within the educational and pro-
fessional population.1 
Because intergenerational family net-
works also are key components in dynasties, 
an analysis of these two forms of mobility 
can give us good indications on dynasty for-
mations in the Norwegian elites. Family re-
lations like these can also be valuable forms 
of social capital, a form of capital that may 
both facilitate the conversion of one form of 
capital into another, and elevate network-
based resource mobilization (DENORD et. 
al., 2011). Furthermore, the analysis of mo-
bility barriers and trajectories will indirectly 
also give information on intergenerational 
strategies for capital conversion. If capital 
assets linked to specific educations or pro-
fessions, e.g. the medical profession, isn’t 
or cannot be reproduced, the inherited or 
embodied cultural capital can nevertheless 
be converted into other specific forms of in-
stitutionalized cultural capital, e.g. from a 
medical degree to a law degree. Put differ-
ently, whereas the volume of institutional-
1. See Hjellbrekke et al. 2007 and Denord et al. 2011, based on data from the Norwegian Power and De-
mocracy Survey on Norwegian elites (Gulbrandsen & al. 2002 ) for further details. According to the survey, 
62% of the elite position holders had a higher university degree or an education at PhD level, while only 
2.6% finished their education after compulsory education. 
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ized cultural capital can be reproduced from 
one generation to the next, the specific type 
of the same capital may even so be different, 
as will also its respective field value. 
Against this background, we address the 
following research questions: What forms of 
intergenerational capital conversion have 
been the most common, and therefore also 
the most acceptable, in the upper and up-
per middle classes in postwar Norway? And 
what conversions have been less common? 
Rephrasing Max Weber’s classic formula-
tion: Can we identify a cluster of elite situa-
tions between which mobility has been both 
easy and typical (WEBER, 1978)? Are there 
clear indications of social closure, also for 
the ones with a social origin at the top of 
the social hierarchy, or are these “elite” mo-
bility structures rather open? How are the 
patterns structured? What have been the 
typical mobility barriers and mobility trajec-
tories between the positions at the top? Can 
we find clear trends, either of stability or in 
the direction of increasing or decreasing cir-
culation? And what can patterns like these 
tell us about the status hierarchies internally 
in what Pierre Bourdieu (BOURDIEU, 1989; 
BOURDIEU & SAINT MARTIN, 1978) con-
ceptualized as a “field of power”? Is it for 
instance possible to identify a hierarchy of 
professions, in that some positions and edu-
cations seem more attractive than others? 
And perhaps even more important: between 
what positions are the family dynastic rela-
tions, and thus also the relations of inherited 
cultural and social capital, the strongest? 
1. Norwegian Egalitarianism
Social mobility occurs in different soci-
etal contexts and in different societal hierar-
chies. The recruitment to top positions varies 
between states (ARON, 1950 a, b; HART-
MANN, 2006), and so does also perceptions 
of how clear the societal hierarchies actually 
are. Norwegian respondents tend to view 
their society in far more egalitarian terms 
than respondents in other countries, includ-
ing neighboring Sweden (HJELLBREKKE & 
KORSNES, 2012). When compared to coun-
tries in Europe and in North and South 
America, the differences become very clear: 
Table 1: Variations of Societal Perceptions. “Type of Society My Country Is” by “Country”. Data from ISSP 
2009. Social Inequality IV   
Country
Type of Society My Country Is Norway GB/UK France Argentina USA
An elite at the top, few in the middle, 
many at the bottom
2.1 14.9 16.4 45.6 17.2
A society that looks like a pyramid, 
with an elite at the top, more in the 
middle, and most at the bottom
10.8 41.9 53.6 36.1 38.9
A pyramid, but with few people at the 
bottom
23.6 18.9 16.3 9.4 15.0
A society where most people are in the 
middle
56.4 20.9 12.1 7.0 26.0
Many people at the top, only very few 
at the bottom
7.1 2.5 1.6 1.9 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100
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Whereas a majority in the other coun-
tries in Table 1 perceive their societies as 
hierarchically organized, the opposite is the 
case for Norway. Perceptions like these do 
not readily go together with the existence 
of distinct elite formations, characterized by 
a high degree of social reproduction from 
one generation to the next, and with high 
levels of marital homogamy. In fact, both 
the existence and the legitimacy of elites 
will easily be considered as more problem-
atic in a country where the degree of social 
inequality is comparatively low. But does 
this imply that these elites do not exist, that 
the tendencies towards social reproduction 
and social closure are low, and that dynas-
tic elements are hard to identify? As our 
analysis will demonstrate, this is hardly the 
case, but it may reflect the legacy of what 
the Norwegian historian Francis Sejersted 
described as the historical “Sonderweg”2 of 
Norwegian modernity (SEJERSTED, 1993). 
Compared to the situation in neigh-
boring Sweden, for instance, the Norwe-
gian elites were weak, and therefore also 
played a less dominant role in the mod-
ernization processes. Unlike in Sweden 
and Denmark, the Norwegian nobility was 
abolished in 1821. The political power of 
the higher civil servants would soon be 
challenged by a coalition of farmers and 
urban bourgeois liberals. Furthermore, the 
industrial and financial bourgeoisie was 
not in a position to finance large-scale in-
dustrial investments. As Sejersted (op.cit.) 
pointed out, the Norwegian state would 
therefore have to play a compensatory 
role; it stepped in as an agent where capi-
talist groups otherwise would have taken 
the lead. Somewhat simplified, the Norwe-
gian elites lacked both the economic and 
cultural capital bases that were found in 
other countries, e.g. France and Sweden 
(PIKETTY, 2019). The formation of elite 
dynasties might therefore have been more 
difficult in Norway, resulting in less stable 
elite formations than in other countries.  
2. Elites and professions
It is not only the analytical relation 
between elites and classes that has been 
contested. The same is the case for the elite 
concept itself. Who is, and who is not a 
part of the elite in a given society? Pareto 
would alternate between a conceptualiza-
tion of the upper classes as an elite or as an 
aristocracy, and also of the elites as a class 
in itself. Internally, the elites were also di-
vided into governing and non-governing 
elites (PARETO, 1935). The recruitment to 
these elites was socially skewed, but Pareto 
emphasized the continuous, and sometimes 
rapid changing of the governing elites, 
i.e. elite circulation (KOLABINSKA, 1912). 
Members of the non-governing elite would 
topple the governing elite, and members 
of other classes would also enter the non-
governing elites. The study of elites was 
therefore also a study of social mobility be-
tween, from and into the elites. 
Others have sought to identify the elites 
by focusing on those in leading positions in 
a set of sectors, e.g. the military, in politics, 
higher civil service, the church, in research, 
culture, business etc. (ARON, 1950a, b). If 
identified like this, many of those included 
in the elites will have a higher education, 
and in many cases also belong to a pro-
fession. Using Andrew Abbotts rather wide 
2. i.e. the “special way” in which Norway went from being a traditional society to becoming an indus-
trial, capitalist society.
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definition, a profession can be understood 
as an exclusive occupational group that 
applies abstract knowledge on a specific 
case (ABBOTT, 1988). The group succeeds 
in claiming an occupational monopoly, 
where only those with the licensed abstract 
knowledge have the jurisdiction to practice. 
In most cases, this necessitates a higher ed-
ucation from a higher educational institu-
tion. In Abbott’s system approach, where 
ongoing struggles about the borders for 
professional power is regarded a key ele-
ment, the hierarchy of professions has three 
levels: free professions, subordinate profes-
sions and “would be”-professions. 
The recruitment to the elites will in 
most cases be much stronger from the first 
of these three levels. For this reason, and 
based on the results found in Hjellbrekke 
et al. 2007 and Denord et al. 2011, even 
though having a higher education or be-
ing a member of a free profession not in 
itself guarantees membership in the elites 
of a given society, our analysis builds on 
two well-documented empirical presuppo-
sitions: 
- Elites are disproportionally recruited 
from those with the highest educations and 
from those that are members of the high-
est levels of the profession and occupation 
hierarchy
- Internally in these two group forma-
tions, elites are more often recruited among 
those who have inherited their educational 
level and/or their professional category. As 
this indicates, a distinct core of inheritors 
can be identified in each of the elite group 
formations.   
In order to examine these “structures of 
inheritance” in greater detail, in the analysis 
of educational reproduction and circulation, 
we restrict ourselves only to include persons 
with the very longest, higher educations, i.e. 
master degree and above. While some of 
these, like medicine and law, clearly belong 
to the professions, this is less obvious for 
educations in languages, history, sociology 
etc. Furthermore, we also restrict the sample 
so that only the intergenerational circula-
tion between a subset of positions, most of 
them belonging to the highest of Abbott’s 
three levels or to higher positions in busi-
ness, is included. With this approach, we 
seek to identify a core of “circulating inheri-
tors” at the top of these two hierarchies; the 
educational and the professional hierarchies. 
3. Circulation Mobility and Conversion 
Strategies
Even though Kolabinska (1912) and 
Pareto (1901) were the first to address the 
problem of circulation mobility, the overall 
majority of sociological studies have found 
more inspiration in Pitirim Sorokin’s work 
on social mobility in general (Sorokin, 1927, 
1933). The research questions have mainly 
focused on whether or not one can identify 
distinct mobility regimes in given types of 
societies, and whether or not clear trends to-
wards increasing or decreasing mobility can 
be found. The results have depended both on 
the available data and on the methods. 
Whereas Sorokin (1927) in his analy-
sis of a wide range of historical sources 
concluded that no clear trends could be 
identified across time and space, Lipset & 
Zetterberg (1956) claimed that the mobility 
regimes in modern industrial societies basi-
cally were the same. The Lipset-Zetterberg 
hypothesis has since been modified sev-
eral times. Featherman, Jones and Hauser 
(1975) concluded that the patterns of cir-
culation were the same in all countries 
where market economy and the nucleus 
family are key institutions. But the level 
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or the strength of the circulation still var-
ied. Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) modified 
this thesis yet again, and claimed that the 
relative mobility, i.e. the level of mobility 
that not can be ascribed to macro structural 
changes e.g. in the labor market, showed 
a high degree of temporal stability. There 
were thus limits to circulation. 
Breen & al. (2004) would revise sev-
eral of these results. Whereas some coun-
tries are characterized by a relatively 
high degree of stability, others are more 
open. The variation with respect to how 
open they actually are, is also substan-
tial. Finally, in their analyses of micro-
class reproduction and micro-class mo-
bility, both Grusky & Weeden (2001) and 
Jonsson & al (2009) find a considerable 
level of occupational reproduction. What 
at first might seem as class reproduction 
is actually strongly linked to the direct 
inter-generational reproduction in oc-
cupations. Important Norwegian studies 
from the 1950s and 60s on the recruit-
ment to higher civil service and to the 
professions, came to similar conclusions 
(AUBERT, 1960; AUBERT et. al., 1960). 
Unfortunately, even though the problem 
of reproduction of, and mobility into the elites 
has been a classic theme at least since Plato’s 
“Republic”, few of the above mentioned stud-
ies have been important sources of inspira-
tion for the sociology of elites. Even so, also 
in the sociology of elites, a high degree of 
mobility has been regarded as positive, both 
because it has legitimized a democratic politi-
cal system, and because it has been seen as a 
way to maximize a society’s human resourc-
es. But some researchers have voiced their 
reservations. In 2008, John Higley (2008, 
16) argued that a high rate of intergenera-
tional mobility into the elites could lead to 
problems. If the “inheritance right” became 
too weak, the elites could loose their moti-
vation and their interest for entering the top 
positions, and the existence of “consensually 
unified elites”, or an “enlightened oligarchy”, 
be threatened (FIELD & HIGLEY, 1980; HIG-
LEY, 2008). Without going into a polemic 
against Higley’s hypotheses and the assump-
tions they build on: where is this “right to 
inheritance” at its strongest in the Norwegian 
case? And are there clear trends of intergen-
erational circulation between the positions 
at the top of the hierarchy? If so: what does 
this tell us about stability and change in elite 
circulation in the assumed egalitarian Norwe-
gian society?
4. Absolute and relative mobility rates
To identify these patterns, it is neces-
sary to analyze both the absolute and the 
relative mobility rates. Briefly explained, 
absolute mobility rates reveal the percent-
ages or proportions of children who have 
either remained in the same positions as 
their parents, i.e. have been immobile, or 
who have moved either upwards, sideways 
or downwards in a given hierarchy. The 
relative mobility rates describe the odds 
children in one position have to end up 
in a given position as compared to those 
of children in other positions. The relative 
mobility rates can thus be expressed as the 
ratio of two odds, i.e. the odds ratio.   
Whereas the outflow percentages tell us 
what destination category the children of a 
given origin category have moved into, the 
inflow percentages reveal the origin compo-
sition of a given destination category. This 
is necessary information if we want to assess 
the size of the group of inheritors, e.g. in the 
medical profession, or if we want to identify 
the typical and atypical intergenerational 
movements in the mobility structures. 
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But if we restrict ourselves only to ex-
amining these patterns, we can easily come 
to wrong conclusions about the relative sta-
bility between t1 and t2. Macro-structural 
changes, e.g. in occupational structures, will 
“force” some children to find other jobs than 
their parents, simply because there are too 
few destination categories for the offspring. 
A typical example is in agriculture, where 
the number of farmers has steadily fallen 
from decade to decade. For many farmers’ 
children, there was no longer an empty posi-
tion that could be filled when they entered 
the labor market. The same is the case for 
the textile and the steel industry in Europe. 
In consequence, these children were “forced” 
into occupational social mobility.      
In mobility research, it has therefore 
been common also to analyze the rela-
tive mobility patterns by way of log-linear 
modelling (EYE & MUN, 2013). The relative 
mobility is the part of the mobility that is 
not caused by macro-structural changes. 
Depending on how they are specified, log-
linear models can reveal whether or not 
there is a statistical association between the 
origin and the destination categories inde-
pendently of such macro-structural chang-
es. If there is an association, what type of 
association is it? Is the association stable or 
does it change over time in a given direc-
tion? Are the chances for mobility the same 
at all the levels in the hierarchy? If they 
change, do they change in the same direc-
tions for all the levels in the hierarchy? By 
analyzing the patterns in the odds ratios, 
these questions can be answered.   
5. Intergenerational Educational Mobility 
at the Top
As in most other modern societies, also 
in Norway, entering higher studies was a 
privilege for the few. In 1950, with a total 
population of 3 million people, there were 
only 6000 registered students in the higher 
educational institutions. Not surprisingly, 
the recruitment was also socially skewed. 
In the academic professions, the children 
of academics, private businessmen and 
higher civil servants were strongly over-
represented. Children of farmers, workers 
and lower middle class occupations would 
instead orient themselves towards educa-
tions in science or engineering (LINDBEKK, 
1962). The two latter educations have also 
had a higher rate of downward social mo-
bility (CHRISTOPHERSEN, 2011). Put dif-
ferently, the more “democratized” the re-
cruitment to a given higher education has 
been, the lower the intergenerational re-
production. Newer studies have confirmed 
the continuity of the trends first revealed in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Hansen, 1999, 2000). 
The recruitment to elite educations is still 
strongly skewed. So are the examination 
results, and the prospects for converting 
institutionalized cultural capital into eco-
nomic capital (HANSEN, 2001). The higher 
the social origin, the better are the average 
grades and the higher the average salary a 
few years down the road. 
As shown by Flemmen (2012), and by 
way of multiple correspondence analysis (see 
HJELLBREKKE, 2018), the Norwegian upper 
class is internally structured along two main 
dimensions. The first separates between high 
and low volumes of inherited capital and 
high and low volumes of educational capi-
tal. The second separates between proprietors 
and higher employees. In a groundbreaking 
recent study, Toft (2018a) has analyzed the 
intra-generational mobility careers within 
this space. By way of sequence analysis 
(CORNWELL, 2016), a clear opposition be-
tween the economic and the cultural capital 
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fraction is revealed. Whereas intra-gener-
ational vertical mobility is rather common, 
intra-generational horizontal mobility is not. 
Movements are therefore more typically sec-
tor-internal than cross-sectorial. Intergener-
ational movements within and into the upper 
class is furthermore polarized by an opposi-
tion between inheritors and newcomers, and 
by an opposition between the economic in-
heritors and the others (TOFT, 2018b). In this 
way, the results from Toft’s recent analyses 
of the upper classes are similar to the results 
found by Hjellbrekke & Korsnes (2005) and 
Hjellbrekke & al. (2007) in their analyses of 
the elites, where a triangular structure, with 
one cultural, one political and one economic 
pole is revealed. In each of these, we find 
a core of inheritors. Inter-sectorial circula-
tion is less common, but is facilitated by 
high volumes of political capital. None of the 
above mentioned studies have sought to an-
alyze the relative mobility. Little is therefore 
known about the elite-internal inter-cohort 
stability in the circulation mobility. Have 
these structures changed over time, and if so, 
in what direction?
When we focus in on the inheritors at 
the top of the educational capital hierarchy, 
i.e. a high-volume capital group within the 
Norwegian upper class, the patterns in the 
absolute mobility are clear: 
Table 2: Father’s higher education when child was 16 yrs old vs. Child’s higher education in 2008. Children 
born 1955-1974. Outflow percentages 
Father’s  
higher  
education
when child 
was 16 yrs 
old. 
Child’s Higher Education 2008
Humani-
ties
Social 
Sciences
Psycho-
logy
Law Econo-
mics
Sciences
Enginee-
ring
Medicine
Odonto-
logy
Total
Humani-
ties
30.3 10.2 4.0 12.3 7.1 22.6 13.5 100
Social 
Sciences
16.1 18.2 4.9 15.8 11.2 24.9 8.8 100
Psycho-
logy
14.8 10.7 21.0 12.4 8.6 20.7 11.7 100
Law 9.8 6.0 2.0 46.7 6.3 20.8 8.4 100
Economics 11.2 9.8 3.3 16.6 20.8 30.4 7.9 100
Sciences
Enginee-
ring
9.2 5.8 2.4 8.4 8.3 55.4 10.5 100
Medicine
Odonto-
logy
9.6 5.5 2.9 11.7 7.1 30.0 33.5 100
Total 12.2 6.7 3.0 13.8 8.0 40.1 16.2 100
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The direct reproduction is both strong 
and systematic for the educations included 
in Table 2. When compared to the cells in 
the row marginal, there are two to three 
times more children in the diagonal cells, 
where the direct reproduction is found. This 
strong over-representation is found in all 
the educations, regardless of whether or 
not the program has had restrictions on the 
intake of students. Summed up: if one first 
succeeds in passing the institutionalized 
cultural capital on to the next generation, 
the offspring will also have a high prob-
ability of inheriting the specific type of in-
stitutionalized cultural capital. As a conse-
quence, a core of inheritors cannot only be 
identified at the top, but also across the top 
of this hierarchy, i.e. in each of the educa-
tional orientations.  
The internal homogeneity of these edu-
cational destination categories is described 
in Table 3: 
Table 3. Father’s education when child was 16 yrs old vs. Child’s education in 2008. Children born 1955-
1974. Inflow percentages 
Father’s 
education
when child 
was 16 yrs 
old.
Child’s Education 2008
Humani-
ties
Social 
Scien-
ces
Psycho-
logy
Law Econo-
mics
Sciences
Enginee-
ring
Medicine
Odonto-
logy
Total
Humanities 30.6 19.0 16.4 11.0 10.8 6.9 10.3 12.3
Social 
Sciences
2.0 4.1 2.4 1.7 2.1 0.9 0.8 1.5
Psychology 1.8 2.4 10.5 1.4 1.6 0.8 1.1 1.5
Law 7.9 8.9 6.6 33.5 7.7 5.1 5.1 9.9
Economics 2.5 4.0 2.9 3.2 7.0 2.1 1.3 2.7
Sciences
Enginee-
ring
36.0 41.6 37.5 29.2 49.4 65.9 31.0 47.7
Medicine
Odontology
19.2 20.0 23.7 20.0 21.4 18.2 50.3 24.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Two educations stand out as the most 
popular among these successful inheritors. 
“Sciences/Engineering” and “Medicine/
Odontology” sum up more of than 70% of 
the children we’ve included in the analysis. 
These two are also the most homogenous 
destination categories with respect to so-
cial origin. 1 in 2 doctors or dentists have 
fathers that themselves studied medicine or 
odontology. In “Sciences/Engineering”, this 
is even higher, where 2 out of 3 have inher-
ited their fathers’ educational orientation. 
In the humanities and in law studies, this 
drops to “only” 1 in 3. 
Even though the barriers not in any 
way are water tight, there are even so 
clear tendencies in the movements de-
scribed in tables 1 and 2. Movements be-
tween Medicine/Odontology and Sciences/
Engineering are relatively common, as are 
movements between Psychology, Social 
Sciences and Humanities. While the inter-
nal exchange in these two clusters is rela-
tively high, the exchange between these 
two, as measured by the outflow percent-
ages, is lower than what could be expect-
ed.  As shown by the inflow percentages, 
Law recruits rather broadly, but children 
with family backgrounds in Sciences/En-
gineering are underrepresented. Based on 
the distributions in Tables 1 and 2, we can 
thus identify three gravitational centers 
in this subspace of educational inheritors. 
One the one side, we find Humanities, So-
cial Sciences and Psychology, and on the 
other, Sciences/Engineering and Medi-
cine/Odontology. Law is in an intermedi-
ate position. 
Because of institutional changes, the chil-
dren in the oldest and the youngest cohorts 
have taken their educations in two different 
educational systems. The strong increase in 
the number of students and of positions at 
top of the educational hierarchy, also im-
plies an educational inflation. The status of 
a given education can therefore be much 
changed from t1 to t2. And while it might 
have become easier to become an “inheri-
tor”, simply because a higher percentage of 
children have taken higher education, this 
might also result in increasing mobility and 
an increasing competition for the most cov-
eted positions from children of lowly edu-
cated parents. This, in turn, might have had 
an impact on the intergenerational circula-
tion and thus also on the conversion of in-
stitutionalized cultural capital from one gen-
eration to the next. Previous analyses have 
found that on a societal level, the pattern 
even so is one of relative stability (HJELL-
BREKKE & KORSNES, 2012). Throughout a 
period of educational expansion, the asso-
ciation between the educational origin and 
the educational destination remained highly 
stable. But is it the same for those who have 
remained at the top? 
Following Louis André Vallet’s analyti-
cal strategy for analyzing social mobility in 
postwar France (VALLET, 1999), we have 
done a series of log-linear analyses of the 
cohorts born 1955-59, 1960-64, 1965-69 
and 1970-74 to model stability and change. 
The results show that it is the model that 
goes under the name of the “Constant So-
cial Fluidity”-model that best describes the 
structures in the data:
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Table 4: Relative Educational Mobility 
Model L-squared D.f. P-value Diss. Ind. BIC % expl. of 
L-squared
Perfect Mobility 4368.13 144 .00 .1906 1690.74
Constant Social 
Fluidity
123 108 .14 .0280 -940 97.2
Uniform differences 
in social fluidity 
(UNIDIFF)
120.94 105 .13 .0195 -914.27 97.2
Uniform differences + 
linear trend
122.31 106 .13 .0204 -922.76 97.2
This model states that the association 
between the row and the column variable – 
Father’s education and Own education – is 
the same in all the four sub-tables that we 
analyze. The result indicates that what we 
might call inter-cohort stability dominates 
in the relative mobility movements: 
-The inheritance or reproduction pat-
terns are the same in all the four cohorts 
we analyze
- The barriers against some movements 
are the same from one cohort to the next. 
Summed up, the typical movements and 
barriers are therefore the same in the four 
birth cohorts we’ve analyzed. But is this 
also the case when it comes to occupational 
and professional mobility?
  
6. Intergenerational Occupational Mobili-
ty at the Top
Already in 1963, Torgersen (1963) 
found that the recruitment to top business 
positions in Norway had been very stable 
over a period of almost 50 years. Despite 
the societal changes brought on by the 
transition from a farmer to an industrial 
society, the mobility into leading societal 
positions remained the same as around 
1900. More recent international, compara-
tive studies of social mobility have come to 
similar conclusions. If one corrects for the 
macro-structural trends, the social mobility 
structures prove to be stable over time (ER-
IKSON & GOLDTHORPE, 1992). But is this 
also the case if we focus in on the occupa-
tional categories that usually are ranked in 
the top of the professional hierarchy?   
In table 5, we zoom in on the intergen-
erational mobility between five positions: 
four classic professions - engineering, 
medicine, law and the religious profession 
– and CEOs in private business. The direct 
reproduction, found in the diagonal cells, 
turns out to vary strongly between the po-
sitions. The inheritance is lowest among the 
CEOs and among the priests and the higher 
clergy (23.2 and 23.9% respectively), but 
close to, or above 60% for three of the four 
classic professions: 
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Table 5: Father’s occupational position 1980 vs. Child’s occupational position 2003-2008. Outflow percen-
tages (N=8781) 
Father’s 
occupational 
position in 
1980
Child’s occupational position 2003-2008.
CEO
Private 
business
Engineering Medicine
Odontology
Law Church Total
CEO
Private 
business
23.2 38.0 22.4 15.5 0.9 100
Engineering 9.9 59.6 20.2 9.5 0.7 100
Medicine
Odontology
4.6 19.4 65.2 10.0 0.7 100
Law 7.3 11.7 18.6 61.5 0.9 100
Church 4.0 19.9 46.0 6.3 23.9 100
Total 13.1 41.9 30.4 13.4 1.2 100
And while the outflow from a church 
origin is strong, the inflow to a church des-
tination is weak. So far, the results therefore 
hint at a division into two or even three sub-
groups; one, where the core of direct inheri-
tors is large, and one, where the intergen-
erational networks to other top positions are 
extensive. But numerically, the movements 
into the religious profession are weak.
Children with a social origin in medicine 
are strongly concentrated in two positions 
- Medicine and Engineering – i.e. two disci-
plines that traditionally are anchored in the 
experimental epistemology that dominates 
in the sciences. But children whose fathers 
held judicial, engineering and science po-
sitions are also drawn to medicine. While 
mobility out of the profession is limited to 
a select few positions, mobility into the po-
sition is more widespread. It is nearby to 
interpret this as an indication on the high 
social status enjoyed by the medical doc-
tors. Mobility into the profession will for 
most children be equal to upward mobility. 
But mobility out of the position will often 
be a sign of downward mobility, even if the 
destination position is located at the upper 
levels of the prestige hierarchies.  
These patterns of intergenerational 
mobility may also be connected with dif-
ferences in access to social capital, and to 
seniority in the field. A strong, inherited 
position- or sector-internal network might 
give access to resources that newcomers 
will find hard to mobilize, and can there-
fore be a valuable form of social capital. 
High volumes of social capital will also 
facilitate capital conversion, and have 
a multiplier effect on the other forms of 
capital. As this indicates, social capital is 
at the same time an individual and a col-
lective asset (BOURDIEU, 1986). Individu-
als, classes, professions and elite group-
ings can be ranked based on their volume, 
value, composition and convertibility of 
both personal and inherited social capital 
(DENORD et. al., 2011). The convertibility 
chances will also vary between positions. 
A successful CEO can convert economic 
capital into symbolic capital, for instance 
by establish a large charity trust or fund. 
For obvious reasons, this option will in 
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most cases not be available to the average 
university professor or priest. 
Even though we do not have data on how 
dense or central individual networks might 
be, the distributions in Table 4 are telling. In 
terms of family based, or inherited social cap-
ital, there are marked differences at the top. If 
we focus on the extent or scope of intergen-
erational family relations to positions outside 
of one’s origin category, the CEOs are at the 
top. But if we focus on the intergenerational 
family relations internally in a position, the 
medical doctors rank highest. While the first 
usually also have the highest volumes of eco-
nomic capital, the second traditionally rank 
highest in terms of social prestige, i.e. a form 
of symbolic capital, and of highly valued in-
stitutionalized cultural capital.   
The inflow percentages are shown in 
Table 6: 
Table 6: Father’s occupational position 1980 vs. Child’s occupational position 2003-2008. Inflow percen-
tages
Father’s 
occupational 
position in 
1980
Child’s occupational position 2003-2008.
CEO
Private 
business
Engineering Medicine
Odontology
Law Church Total
CEO
Private 
business
59.0 30.1 24.5 38.4 23.1 33.2
Engineering 31.4 58.8 27.5 29.3 23.1 41.3
Medicine
Odontology
7.0 9.2 42.7 14.9 12.0 19.9
Law 2.0 1.0 2.2 16.6 2.8 3.6
Church 0.6 1.0 3.0 0.9 38.9 2.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
As these distributions show, the relative 
sizes of the cores of inheritors vary strong-
ly between the positions, as does also the 
social origin-composition. Two positions 
stand out as the most homogenous: CEOs 
in private business and Engineering/Sci-
ence, where 9 out 10 have a social origin 
in either business or engineering families. 
Even though a distinct core of direct in-
heritors also is found in medicine, law and 
theology, the heterogeneity is much larger. 
There are two main reasons why we 
find these patterns interesting. Firstly, 
the mobility trajectories indicate a two-
dimensional status hierarchy in the Nor-
wegian field of power. One dimension, 
where educations and positions are linked 
to the technical-economic system, and 
where economic capital and educational 
credentials with high relevance for indus-
try (engineering/science) are given high 
importance, has its highest appeal among 
children with the same types of educations 
and positions. The other dimension is more 
strongly linked to cultural capital (health, 
law, religion), and has a wider appeal to 
children from a broader range in the upper 
and upper middle classes. Along both these 
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dimensions, there are clear family dynastic 
tendencies. But they are differently config-
ured. The first takes the shape of intercon-
nectedness between CEOs, engineers and 
persons with a science education, but the 
direct social reproduction is less strong (cf. 
Table 3). The second is centered around a 
strong social reproduction in two profes-
sions; medicine and law.   
Secondly, these patterns indicate that 
there are clear differences with respect to 
the range of the given positions’ social 
capital assets. The most “family-isolated” 
position is that of the engineers, where a 
narrow recruitment base into the posi-
tion is combined with a selective outflow 
to other positions. Historically, this posi-
tion was highly attractive for upwardly 
mobile working class children (LINDBEKK, 
1962; HANSEN, 1999), but has also had a 
high rate of downwardly mobile children 
(CHRISTOPHERSEN, 2011). For the clergy, 
the opposite is the case. The direct repro-
duction rate is low, and the export to other 
positions high. The inflow is also rather 
broad. As a consequence, the family net-
works are more extensive. This profession 
was the first to be “democratized”, in that 
it was the first that recruited more broadly, 
e.g. sons   of farmers (MANNSÅKER, 1954). 
The CEOs, the medical doctors and the 
lawyers combine strong intergenerational 
family networks and relatively broad inter-
generational networks to other positions in 
the field. These three origin and destination 
positions thus combine strong position-in-
ternal ties and extensive (but not necessar-
ily weak) position-external ties. The direct 
reproduction is high in both Medicine and 
Law, but they have also a strong inflow 
from other positions. For the CEOs, the in-
flow is rather limited. But the outflow is 
strong. Those who remain in the position 
will therefore have extensive, aggregated 
networks to the other top positions. As a 
consequence, for all of these three, a strong 
position-internal mobilization potential is 
combined with a similarly strong potential 
for position-external resource mobilization. 
But given that the number of engineers, 
medical doctors, lawyers and CEOs has in-
creased sharply in the period we study, the 
above outlined distributions might also be 
affected by macro-structural changes. If we 
control for this overall trend; has the in-
crease in destination positions changed the 
statistical association between the origin 
and the destination variable from cohort to 
cohort? If the answer is yes: in what di-
rection? Has the mobility structure become 
more open or more closed?  
7. Relative professional mobility
In order to answer these questions, we 
must examine the structures in the rela-
tive mobility rates. The log-linear analyses 
show that also in this case, the constant 
social fluidity model is the one that best 
describes the mobility trajectories in the 
analyzed cohorts:  
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Table 7: Relative professional mobility
Model L-squared D.f. P-value Diss. Ind. BIC % expl. of 
L-squared
Perfect Mobility 3288.72 64 .00 .2072 1768.94
Constant Social Fluidity 42.40 48 .70 .0151 -393.44 98.7
Uniform differences in 
social fluidity (UNIDIFF)
42.14 45 .62 .0148 -367.20 98.7
Uniform differences + 
linear trend
41.71 46 .65 .0154 -375.98 98.7
3. Daughters born 1965-74 are excluded because of too many empty cells in the table. This is a known 
problem in log-linear modelling. 
The family dynastic networks that we 
have described above are therefore stable 
from one cohort to the next, indicating that 
a “double stability regime” reigns in this 
part of the Norwegian population. Despite 
the expansion of the educational system, 
and despite the structural changes in the 
upper levels of the professional hierarchy, 
the origin-destination association not only 
remains intact. It even displays a high de-
gree of inter-cohort stability. 
But while this might be the case at a 
family level, what the above analysis fails 
to take into account, is the sharp increase 
in women’s participation in the work force. 
And knowing that also in Norway, “the 
glass ceiling” has been a reality in many 
professions and perhaps particularly in pri-
vate business, there are good reasons to be-
lieve that the mobility barriers have been 
different for daughters and sons. Further-
more, previous analyses have found that 
unlike men, women in the field of power 
can be grouped together in only three clus-
ters; a cluster of upwardly mobile women 
with low global capital volumes, a cluster of 
“meritocrats”, characterized by high educa-
tions, and a cluster of inheritors, with high 
volumes of inherited social capital (HJELL-
BREKKE & KORSNES, 2016). In what ways 
might gender specific trajectories affect or 
change the patterns and the associations 
we’ve uncovered so far? 
If we apply the same modelling strategy 
and separate between sons born 1955-64, 
1965-74, and daughters born 1955-643, the 
results turn out to be different: 
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Table 8: Relative professional mobility. Sons and daughters
Model L-squared D.f. P-value Diss. Ind. BIC % expl. of 
L-squared
Perfect Mobility 1963.26 48 .00 .2087 1539.68
Constant Social Fluidity 44.82 32 .066 .0212 -237.56 97.7
Uniform differences in 
social fluidity (UNIDIFF)
35.44 30 .227 .0172 -229.30 98.2
In table 8, it’s the UNIDIFF (UNIform 
DIFFerences)-model that best describes 
the mobility structures in the three tables 
we analyze. Under this model, we postu-
late that the basic patterns in the move-
ments are the same from t1 to t2, or from 
one table to the next, but that the intensity 
varies from cohort to cohort. One cohort is 
defined as the reference cohort, which the 
circulation or mobility in the other cohorts 
are measured against. If the association be-
tween the origin and the destination has 
become stronger, the relative mobility has 
decreased. When this is the case, the pa-
rameter value is >1.00. If the opposite is the 
case, the value is <1.00. In table 9, we find 
both of these outcomes to be true:  
 
Table 7: Unidiff-parameters. 
Cohort UNIDIFF-parameter
Sons born 1955-64 1.00
Sons born 1965-74 1.0756
Daughters born 1955-64 .8496
For the sons, the origin-destination as-
sociation has become 7.56% (1.0756) stron-
ger from the oldest to the youngest cohort. 
Sons born 1965-74 have therefore expe-
rienced a more rigid mobility structure at 
the top than their older brothers. For the 
daughters, the result is the opposite. Even if 
the basic mobility structure is the same, the 
association is 15% weaker, and the mobil-
ity 15% stronger, than among the sons be-
longing to the same birth cohort, and 22% 
stronger than among the youngest sons. 
As this indicates, the daughters are less in-
clined to follow in their fathers’ footsteps. 
Furthermore, intergenerational social capi-
tal relations to other positions rely more 
strongly on father-daughter relations than 
on father-son relations. But this said, one 
should keep Beller’s (2009) important cri-
tique of social mobility-research in mind: 
we know too little about mother-daughter 
mobility, but we do know that mothers 
matter. The relative mobility for women 
might therefore be exaggerated.     
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8. Barriers and Trajectories. Intergeneratio-
nal Conversion Strategies
In the sociology of elites and of social 
mobility, indications on what Parkin (1979) 
conceptualized as social closure, either 
structural or intentional, is seen as a key 
element in how resources are monopolized, 
and how privileges are transferred from 
one generation to the next. If the number 
of destination positions is limited, access to 
these positions becomes all the more im-
portant. The higher the intergenerational 
reproduction rate, the stronger is also the 
resource monopolization. 
Similarly, family-dynastic networks are 
also good indicators on the potential for re-
source mobilization. While strong position-
internal networks can be both exclusive and 
excluding, networks to family members in 
other positions in top positions can have a 
multiplier effect on already existing capital 
types and volumes. From one generation to 
the next, it can also be a way of convert-
ing one form of capital to another. When 
the leading politician’s son or daughter be-
comes a CEO, s/he not only converts politi-
cal capital into economic capital; s/he also 
inherits the father’s or mother’s network. 
To be a member of a family dynasty can 
thus be a highly valuable form of inher-
ited social capital. Also for that reason, the 
structure, the stability and the changes of 
these dynastic relations must be analyzed. 
For as our analyses show, even in the 
Norwegian elites, some inheritors prove to 
be “more equal than others”. To gain in-
sight into how structural oppositions be-
tween top positions are reproduced, how 
the elites are internally polarized, how the 
monopolization of assets takes place, its 
consequences, and insight into how privi-
leges are transferred from one generation 
to the next, is therefore a necessary un-
dertaking in any sociological study of the 
elites and the upper classes. 
Combining studies of the structur-
ing of the Norwegian field of power (see 
HJELLBREKKE et al., 2007; DENORD et al., 
2011) with studies of internal and inter-
generational circulation at the top of the 
Norwegian educational and professional 
hierarchies, may thus not only serve as an 
example of how the gap between the so-
ciology of social class and the sociology 
of elites can be bridged. It also makes it 
possible to address the recurring problem 
of how to simultaneously analyze social 
stability and social change, and to assess 
whether, or to what degree it is correct that: 
“plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”. 
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RESUMO
Apesar dos apelos para suprir a lacuna entre 
a sociologia das classes sociais e a sociologia 
das elites, há poucos exemplos em que isso 
tenha sido feito. Este artigo busca fazer isso 
aplicando abordagens e técnicas estatísticas 
comumente utilizadas em estudos de mobi-
lidade social em nas análise da mobilidade 
de circulação em formações de elite. Com 
base em dados de registro de toda a popula-
ção norueguesa nascida entre 1955 e 1975, 
analisamos a mobilidade educacional e pro-
fissional intergeracional entre "os herdeiros 
bem-sucedidos". Desta forma, e focalizando 
as barreiras e as trajetórias de mobilidade, 
buscamos descobrir os padrões de estabili-
dade e de mudança nas relações dinásticas 
familiares, ou seja, relações que se baseiam 
principalmente em formas hereditárias de 
capital. Além disso, esses padrões podem 
revelar quais formas de conversão interge-
racional de capital têm sido as mais comuns 
e, portanto, também, as mais aceitáveis nas 
classes média-alta e na classe alta da No-
ruega do pós-guerra, e quais conversões têm 
sido menos comuns. Os resultados indicam 
que, mesmo nas elites norueguesas suposta-
mente igualitárias, alguns herdeiros provam 
ser "mais iguais do que outros".
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Elites. Conversão in-
tergeracional de capital. Mobilidade. Cir-
culação no topo.
ABSTRACT
Despite calls for bridging the gap between 
the sociology of social class and the socio-
logy of elites, there are few examples whe-
re this actually has been done. This arti-
cle seeks to do so by applying approaches 
and statistical techniques commonly used 
in studies of social mobility in an analy-
sis of circulation mobility in elite forma-
tions. Based on register data on the whole 
Norwegian population born 1955-1975, we 
analyze the educational and professional 
intergenerational mobility among “the suc-
cessful inheritors”. In this way, and by fo-
cusing on mobility barriers and trajectories, 
we seek to uncover patterns of stability and 
change in family dynastic relations, i.e. re-
lations that primarily are based on inheri-
ted forms of capital. These patterns can also 
reveal what forms of intergenerational ca-
pital conversion have been the most com-
mon, and therefore also the most accepta-
ble, in the upper and upper middle classes 
in postwar Norway, and what conversions 
have been less common. The results indica-
te that even in the supposedly egalitarian 
Norwegian elites, some inheritors prove to 
be “more equal than others”.
KEY-WORDS: Elite. Intergerational capi-
tal conversion. Mobility. Circulation an the 
top.
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